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1 Introduction
Whether selecting a meal at a restaurant, searching for a supplier in a directory, choosing a product
from a website or comparing firms within a set of search engine results, consumers frequently make
choices from lists of options. It is well known that when faced with such lists, individuals often
show a disproportionate tendency to select options that are placed at the top. This is evident
from the vast expenditures that firms pay for sponsored links in search results, the recent antitrust
controversies regarding the alleged bias within Google’s search results1, and from a large number of
academic studies. For example, the previous literature shows that demand increases markedly for
firms that are positioned at the top of search engine results (e.g. Smith and Brynjolfsson 2001, Xu
and Kim 2008, Ghose and Yang 2009, Baye et al 2009, Ellison and Ellison 2009, Baye et al 2012),
consumers are more likely to click on the links at the top of a list of email advertisements (Ansari
and Mela 2003), voters are more inclined to choose candidates placed at the top of ballot papers
(e.g. Miller and Krosnick 1998, Koppell and Steen 2004, Ho and Imai 2008, Blocksom 2008, King
and Leigh 2009 and Meredith and Salant 2011) and academics tend to download or cite papers that
are listed first in journals (e.g. Pinkowitz 2002 and Coupe et al 2010). However, the explanations
for such choice-based ‘top position effects’ or ‘primacy effects’ remain far less clear. Are top-placed
options more likely to be selected simply because the higher quality options have been placed in
top positions and if not, why might individuals show a systematic tendency to select options in
top position?
Insights into these questions would help understand a variety of important issues across many
areas of economics. For example, in relation to the Google case above, such insights could help
analyse the incentives (or disincentives) for suppliers to compete for the top positions within search
engines and directories (e.g. Armstrong et al 2009, Athey and Ellison 2010 and McDevitt 2012), as
well as a variety of broader issues regarding the design and effects of such platforms. In addition,
such insights could help investigate the extent to which firms can manipulate consumers’ choices
through the selection and presentation of their product ranges, or the potential for policymakers
to assist individuals in selecting beneficial options, such as more suitable savings and insurance
plans or healthier food items (Dayan and Bar-Hillel 2011).
To help address these issues, this paper analyses the causes of top position effects by using a
natural field experiment with a group of subjects that should be the least likely to depart from the
predictions of standard theory - economists. Economists often make their research papers available
on a well-known online database, Research Papers in Economics (RePEc). Many economists also
choose to be kept informed of recent additions to the database by subscribing to a free email alert
1See, for example, www.ftc.gov/opa/2013/01/google.shtm and http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
IP-13-371_en.htm, accessed May 10th 2013.
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service conducted by New Economic Papers (NEP), which regularly compiles lists of new papers.
By randomising the order in which items are presented within such lists and measuring subscribers’
subsequent download activity, this paper improves our understanding of the causes of top position
effects in two main regards. First, by using a novel method based on the measurement of other
position effects, it is able to test and reject three explanatory hypotheses that are commonly
referred to within the literature. Second, it demonstrates how the causes of top position effects
are inherently linked to list length. In short lists, top position effects are shown to have a trivial
explanation but as list length increases, top position effects become larger and start to exhibit
features that indicate a more fundamental source. In view of these results, we then discuss how
top position effects may be more consistent with some less-studied and more complex explanations,
such as bounded rationality or memory limitations, and urge the literature to better consider such
hypotheses in the future.
The first part of the empirical analysis assesses an explanation based on the specific order in
which the items have been presented. Under H1 (specific item order), top position effects arise
only because an item with a relatively high value happens to have been placed in top position.
Unsurprisingly, as NEP usually tries to sort items into some descending order of value, we find that
items in top position receive significantly more downloads than items in other positions. However,
inconsistent with a pure explanation of specific item order (H1), significant top position effects
remain, albeit at a smaller magnitude, even when the order of items is deliberately randomised as
part of the experiment.
Using a second, original method, we then test the explanations of choice fatigue and value
signals. Under H2 (choice fatigue), top position effects occur only because the costs of evaluating
or selecting an item are increasing from top position downwards, as consistent with individuals
who consider the items from the top downwards and have total costs of time that are convex.
Alternatively, under H3 (value signals), individuals cannot fully assess an item’s quality but are
more likely to select the item in top position only because they expect, perhaps incorrectly, that
a better informed list-maker has deliberately arranged the items in descending order of value. As
these hypotheses imply that individuals either face evaluation/selection costs that are increasing
from top position downwards or expect items to be arranged in descending order of value, download
activity in both cases should be weakly decreasing from the top to the bottom of the list. Yet,
contrary to these explanations, we show that items in bottom position receive significantly more
downloads than the items in the position immediately above them. In fact, items in bottom
position receive significantly more downloads than average, such that the data is characterised by
both top position effects and some relatively smaller, ‘bottom position effects’ or ‘recency effects’.
Consequently, the paper rejects the possibility that the common hypotheses H1-H3 can offer a
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full explanation for top position effects and indicates that their cause remains more complex. To
help provide a better explanation, the paper then explores some empirical regularities relating to
the role played by the number of items within a list. The size of top position effects is shown to
increase with list length. When lists are longer, individuals focus their download activity towards
top position. More substantially, by dividing the data into subsamples of short and long lists, the
paper then demonstrates how list length has an important impact on the causes of top position
effects. When lists are short, top position effects disappear once the order of items is randomised
as wholly consistent with an explanation of specific item order (H1). However, when lists are
long, top position effects become robust to randomisation and significant bottom position effects
begin to emerge in ways that reject all three hypotheses, H1-H3. Increases in list length appear
to prompt qualitative changes in individual behaviour which generate larger top position effects
that have a more fundamental source. In line with this possibility, the data also offers a suggestion
that, in longer lists, download activity may be less sensitive to aspects of each paper’s listed
summary information, including the paper’s number of authors, abstract and number of keywords,
as consistent with individuals making relatively less use of the listed summary information to
guide their decision-making. The final section of the paper then discusses how some less-studied
and more complex explanations, such as bounded rationality or memory limitations, may offer a
better description of the results.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 now provides a detailed comparison of the paper to
the existing literature. Before Section 5 reviews the hypotheses and discusses the two empirical
tests, Sections 3 and 4 discuss the NEP email alert service, the experimental procedures and the
data. The main empirical analysis is conducted in Sections 6 and 7, before Section 8 explores the
role of list length. Section 9 discusses some other possible explanations and Section 10 concludes.
2 Previous Literature
The existence of top and/or bottom position effects has been previously well documented in a
variety of contexts. However, our paper differs to the previous literature by focusing on the
conceptually distinct and less-studied issue of position effects within individual choice when options
are visually presented in a list.2 Moreover, our paper differs to much past research by focusing on
better understanding the causes of top position effects, including the role played by the number of
2Other contexts include how individuals i) use lists of evidence to form impressions or judgments (e.g. Asch
1946, Hogarth and Einhorn 1992), ii) evaluate between alternatives in performance contests or product sampling
tests (e.g. Ginsburgh and van Ours 2003, Haan et al 2005, Biswas et al 2010), iii) choose which response to endorse
in surveys (e.g. Schwarz et al 1992) and iv) recall items in memory tasks (e.g. Tan and Ward 2000). We return to
discuss the effects of memory in Section 9.
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listed items. This section now provides a relatively detailed review because many existing studies
come from outside economics and have rarely been connected. Previous studies are classified into
three settings, which we refer to as ‘limited selection’, ‘unlimited selection’ and ‘repeated choice’.
2.1 Limited Selection Setting. In this setting, individuals face a one-off decision to select one
item (or some other fixed number of items) from the list of alternatives. Examples include the
decision of which site to buy a DVD from after an internet search, which main course to choose
at a restaurant, or which candidate to vote for. This is the most common setting for studying top
position effects within individual choice but differs from our own setting of ‘unlimited selection’,
where individuals are not inherently constrained in the number of items they are willing or able
to select.
The market studies listed within the introduction (e.g. Smith and Brynjolfsson 2001, Xu and
Kim 2008, Ghose and Yang 2009, Baye et al 2009, Ellison and Ellison 2009, Baye et al 2012; Ansari
and Mela 2003) offer some useful evidence of top position effects, even after allowing for extensive
controls, such as the prominence of firms’ names (e.g. Baye et al 2012). However, the focus of
these papers is not on understanding the causes of top position effects. Notably, because the lists
in these studies were always arranged by a private firm, it is difficult to rule out an explanation
of specific item order (H1). To avoid this explanation, Murphy et al (2006) and Dayan and Bar-
Hillel (2011) present field experiments where the order of items on a restaurant’s website or menu
was randomised. They both still report the existence of positive top position effects, while also
documenting some positive bottom position effects. Our paper has some related findings but we
use our results to test between competing explanations, while also exploiting variation in the length
of lists to further understand the causes of top position effects.
In a related literature, voters are shown to often exhibit a tendency to vote for the candidate
placed at the top of the ballot list (e.g. Miller and Krosnick 1998, Koppell and Steen 2004, Ho and
Imai 2008, Blocksom 2008, King and Leigh 2009 and Meredith and Salant 2011). As legislation
often requires the order of ballots to be determined (quasi-) randomly, these results cannot be
explained by specific item order (H1). Instead, most papers jump to an explanation of satisficing
(Simon 1955), where individuals start from the top and face marginal inspection costs for each
item, which in our different setting, is analagous to choice fatigue (H2). Further results within
this literature suggest that top position effects are i) accompanied by lower votes for the candidate
in the median ballot position (Meredith and Salant 2011) and ii) larger in ballots with a higher
number of candidates (Ho and Imai 2008 and Blocksom 2008). We find some related results but
go beyond these papers by using the existence of other position effects to test between a variety of
explanations and by showing how list length can have an important effect on the cause, as well as
the size, of top position effects.
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2.2 Unlimited Selection Setting. This is the setting considered in the current paper, where
there is no inherent constraint on the number of items an individual is able or willing to select.
Here, individuals are free to select any number of items from a list and the items are sufficiently
non-substitutable that it is quite reasonable for individuals to select multiple items. In addition to
our download environment, other examples include browsing amongst different items on a website
or considering which books to buy from a list of bestsellers.
Previous work in this setting has been minimal and has only considered individuals’ decisions
to download (or cite) academic articles from journal issues. Pinkowitz (2002) uses data from the
Journal of Finance website where individuals are able to download two types of papers: those
already published and those accepted for publication but not yet assigned a position within an
issue. The fact that top-placed papers receive significantly more downloads than other papers
even before being assigned to a top position supports an explanation of specific item order (H1).
However, the fact that such papers receive an additional download effect after being assigned
also points to some other explanation. In a related study, Coupe et al (2010) consider how future
citations vary across papers placed in the top five positions within issues of the European Economic
Review. Between 1975 and 1997, the journal switched repeatedly between presenting its papers in
author-alphabetical order and editor-chosen order. Consistent with an explanation of specific item
order (H1), top position effects exist for editor-ordered issues. However, contrary to H1, smaller
top position effects also exist within alphabetically-ordered issues. Without any further testing
and without an acknowledgment of choice fatigue (H2), both papers explain their results in terms
of value signals (H3). In contrast, we show how the measurement of other positions, especially
bottom position, can be used to test both H2 and H3, and investigate the important role of list
length in understanding top position effects. As explained in Section 6, we also use a less restrictive
estimation methodology.
2.3 Repeated Choice Setting. Finally, some related, but somewhat different studies focus on
a setting where individuals face a sequence of decisions. Individuals are shown to be more likely
to abstain or resort to heuristics after having made a larger number of previous decisions. For
example, Levav et al (2010) use a set of field experiments to examine how consumers behave when
faced with a series of product customization decisions. They show that consumers are more likely
to pick the default option in later decisions and that this effect is stronger when the preceding
decisions have involved a relatively large set of alternatives. Augenblick and Nicholson (2012)
provide a detailed study of some similar effects in voting behaviour when ballot papers contain
multiple contests. Using some exogenous variation in the order in which the contests are presented,
they show that as contests move down the ballot paper, individuals are more likely i) to abstain
from voting, ii) to vote for the default option and iii) to display a bias towards candidates listed first
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within a contest. Both papers explain these effects by suggesting that the act of making difficult
previous decisions reduces the availability of an individual’s cognitive resources and Augenblick
and Nicholson refer to this as ‘choice fatigue’. Within our different setting, our paper also tests
a form of choice fatigue (under H2) but rejects it as an explanation of top position effects due
to the presence of positive bottom position effects. This indicates that future studies within this
literature may benefit from specifically exploring individuals’ decisions at the very end of a series.
3 RePEc and NEP
Before considering the hypotheses and empirical analysis, Sections 3 and 4 now discuss the context
of the experiment and the data. Research Papers in Economics (RePEc) is a popular (decen-
tralized) online database of both published and unpublished economics research papers. As part
of RePEc, New Economics Papers (NEP) offers a free email alert service. It provides regular
email announcements of new papers that have been recently added to the RePEc database. Such
announcements are often provided on a weekly basis and are generated for 80 separate research
subfields, such as health or monetary economics. Subscribers can select which subfields they wish
to subscribe to and NEP has well over 60000 total subscriptions.3
Each email announcement has two sections of text. An extract from an example announcement
is provided in Appendix 1. The top section informs the reader of how many papers are included
within the announcement and includes a list of papers with their titles and authors. If a reader
clicks on the title of any paper within the list, or scrolls down, she is taken to the bottom section of
the announcement. The bottom section repeats the same list with additional summary information
for each paper, including the paper’s abstract, keywords, JEL classification codes, date (if these
are available) and most importantly, a link to a full text version of the paper. By clicking on a
paper’s link, a new window is opened and the paper is downloaded. There are no restrictions on
the number of different papers an individual can download. For brevity, from this point forward,
the terms ‘announcement’ and ‘list’ will be used interchangeably.
The announcements for each subfield are managed by an editor, who is a volunteer from
academia or the public sector, and are compiled as follows. First, NEP gathers a list of all new
papers that have been recently added to the RePEc database. An algorithm then uses past data
with information from each paper’s title and abstract to arrange these papers into some descending
order of estimated value. The list is then passed on to the subfield editors so that they can pick
out the papers that are relevant for their own subfield announcement (although some editors may
prefer to use a non-sorted version of the list). After selecting their relevant papers, each editor
3For more, see http://repec.org/, http://nep.repec.org/ or Batiz-Lazo and Krichel (2010) for a brief history.
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is free to amend the order in which the papers are presented within their subfield announcement
or leave them in the order suggested by the algorithm. (Within our sample) about two-thirds
of editors usually amend the order of their lists, most with the intention of improving upon the
algorithm’s attempts to put the more interesting and relevant papers towards the top. Neither the
use of the algorithm nor an editor’s decision rule is ever made explicit to subscribers.
As later discussed in more detail, it can be the case that a paper is selected to be in the list
of more than one subfield. Therefore, to avoid confusion, we will now make a distinction between
‘papers’ and ‘items’. An item will refer to an entry on a specific list, whereas a paper will refer to
the underlying piece of research that can appear as an item in the lists of multiple subfields.
RePEc measures the download activity for each item in an extremely precise manner. First,
it measures the number of downloads that occur specifically via the links contained within NEP
announcements, not just those that occur through RePEc more generally. Second, in cases where
a paper appears in the list of multiple subfields, RePEc offers a measurement of the number of
downloads received for each separate list appearance. It is important to understand this point. The
measurement of downloads is item-specific, not paper-specific, and it is this measurement which
allows us to analyse the relationship between list position and subsequent download activity in a
meaningful manner.
4 Experimental Procedures and Data
After requesting permission from NEP, we were granted the opportunity to measure the aggregate
number of downloads received by each item in lists released between 31st August 2008 and 24th
January 2009 across 29 subfields.4
As the more relevant and popular papers are likely to be placed near the top of lists, one would
automatically expect the existence of top position effects. However, to explore the possibility of
top position effects in more detail, we were granted the further opportunity to manipulate the
order in which items were presented for a small proportion of lists within our sample released after
September 20th.
To conduct the experiment, we asked NEP and the relevant editors to continue collecting and
ordering their lists as they would do under normal circumstances. However, before the release of
4The 29 subfields appear representative and cover a wide range of different areas of economics. Their titles are
Africa, Ageing, Agricultural, Cognitive and Behavioural, Collective Decision Making, Computational Economics,
Dynamic General Equilibrium, Education, Efficiency and Productivity, Time Series, Experimental, Forecasting,
Happiness, Health, History and Philosophy, Human Capital, International Trade, Intellectual Property, Knowl-
edge Management, Microfinance, Microeconomics, Migration, Marketing, Monetary, Post Keynesian, Project and
Portfolio Management, Risk Management, Sports and Transition.
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any given list, we intervened and randomly allocated the list into one of two groups. Within each
subfield, around two-thirds of the lists were allocated to the control group and the remaining lists
were allocated to the treatment group. Any list within the control group was sent to subscribers
with no alterations. The order of items was left completely unchanged. However, any list within
the treatment group had its items re-arranged into a random order with the use of a random
number generator. Subscribers were then emailed an identical announcement containing the list in
its new order. Lists were always sent in the common format with no indication of whether the list
was randomised or otherwise. No changes were made to the content of the lists and at no point
were the subscribers made aware of the experiment.
Using NEP’s item-specific download measurements, the accumulated number of downloads was
then measured for each item on each list from the release of its announcement until a final cut-off
date, almost two years later, on the 20th December 2010. The use of a cut-off date could be
inappropriate if it prevented the full measurement of downloads, but here the measurement period
is extremely long and should capture all related download activity. However, the use of a single
cut-off date does imply that lists with different release dates are monitored for different lengths of
time. While this should not be problematic given the long measurement period, explicit account
for this is made later in the testing and estimation methodologies.
Table 1 provides some summary statistics in regard to the final sample and breaks the data
down across the control and treatment groups. (All tables and figures are included at the end
of the paper.) After discarding a few announcements that contained only a single item, the final
sample includes 577 lists with 6740 listed items which, in aggregate, received 36276 downloads.5
The average list contains 11.68 items and the average item received 5.38 downloads. 6% of the
items received zero downloads. The 6740 listed items stem from 4985 different papers. Within our
sample, an average paper therefore appears on 1.35 subfield lists (or 3.88 subfield lists if one also
considers lists outside our sample of 29 subfields). We later address this feature of the data within
our estimation procedure.
5 Explanatory Hypotheses and Empirical Tests
As a platform for the empirical analysis, we now review three explanatory hypotheses for top posi-
tion effects (H1-H3) that are commonly referred to within the literature and outline two empirical
tests. As the existing literature contains no theoretical model of top position effects within our un-
5Two further lists were discarded as outliers. Within these lists, two items (placed last in a list of 10 items and
13th in a list of 18 items) had an excessively large interest with 244 and 222 downloads, relative to the maximum
number of downloads in the remaining sample, 69. In a rare occurrence, it is suspected that the NEP list links for
these two items were copied onto some other website, with the result of artificially increasing their prominence.
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limited selection setting, we use the following simplified framework to help clarify our discussion.6
Consider a list with n ≥ 2 items. Define the position of item j as pj , where pj = 1 if item j is in
top position and pj = n if item j is in bottom position. Let individual i’s true value of downloading
and reading item j, Vij , derive from two components, such that Vij = vi(sj) + ui(εj). The first
component, sj , can be observed by individual i through inspection of item j’s listed summary
information (title, authors, abstract, keywords, JEL codes and date). Individual i can then assign
item j an ‘observable value’, vi(sj). However, the second component, εj , remains unobservable to
individual i until after she has read the item. It could reflect the underlying quality of the paper
not captured by, or related to, sj . The level of εj provides individual i with an ‘unobservable value’,
ui(εj), and we assume individuals prefer higher levels of εj , with u
′
i(εj) > 0. Before downloading
item j, individual i can only form an estimate of this second component, εˆj .
To explain why individuals might download some items and not others, one must assume the
existence of some form of costs. We could introduce a cost of inspecting each item’s summary
information such that individuals would have to search amongst the items. However, this only
adds unnecessary complexity, especially within our non-standard setting of unlimited selection.
Instead, and without loss for our illustrative purposes, suppose that individual i can freely inspect
each item’s summary information and position, but faces a cost of time (or effort) to actually
download any given item, ci. As there is no inherent constraint on the number of items that
individuals are able to download, the following simple decision rule is optimal - download any item
j if its expected value, Vˆij = vi(sj) + ui(εˆ), is greater than or equal to its associated download
cost, ci.
Top position effects will be defined to exist when the item in top position receives significantly
more downloads than the average number of downloads received by items in all other positions.
We now consider three hypotheses that are commonly referred to within the literature. As further
discussed in Section 9, these explanations are not exhaustive.
H1: Specific Item Order. Top position effects exist only because individuals can observe
that the item in top position happens to have a relatively large value.
Suppose that individual i believes that each item’s position reveals no information about its
unobservable component, εˆj = ε ∀j. She therefore expects any variation in the value of the listed
items to be captured solely by the items’ summary information, with Vˆij = vi(sj) + ui(ε). H1
then suggests that top position effects exist only because of the rather trivial reason that the items
6A small literature of theoretical work exists within the limited selection setting where individuals must directly
choose between alternatives (e.g. Rubinstein and Salant 2006 and Salant 2011) but this is not easily transferred to
our setting. We further discuss this work in Section 9.
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happen to be ordered in such a way that the item in top position has a relatively large observable
value. For example, given constant download costs, ci(pj) = c ∀j, individual i could display top
position effects when vi(sj) + ui(ε) ≥ c for pj = 1, and vi(sk) + ui(ε) < c for some pk > 1.
H2: Choice Fatigue. Top position effects exist only because individuals have download costs
that are increasing from top position downwards.
Suppose that download costs now vary with item position, ci(pj), and that individuals have
download costs such that ci (pj) ≤ ci (pk) for any pj < pk. H2 then suggests that top placed-items
are more likely to be downloaded only because individuals find lower-placed items increasingly
costly to download. This would be consistent with the possibility where an individual i) exhibits
total costs of time that are convex in the number of downloads she completes and ii) considers
whether to download each item sequentially in a strict linear order from top position downwards.7
H3: Value Signals. Top position effects exist only because individuals believe (perhaps
incorrectly) that the items have been arranged in descending order of value by a better informed
agent.
Suppose that individual i believes (perhaps incorrectly) that the list has been arranged by
an expert agent m who has the ability to observe each item’s observable and unobservable com-
ponents, sj and εj . Moreover, suppose that individual i believes that agent m has placed the
items in descending order according to agent m’s assessment of item values, such that pj < pk
if Vmj = vm(sj) + um(εj) ≥ Vmk = vm(sk) + um(εk). In our context, this would correspond
to a situation where an individual has, perhaps through experience, formed the belief that NEP
usually sorts its items by value. H3 then suggests that top-positioned items are more likely to be
downloaded only because, on average, individuals expect items with larger unobservable compo-
nents to be placed in higher positions. For example, consider an extreme case where each item’s
summary information reveals nothing about its value, v(sj) = v(s) ∀j. As items then vary only in
unobservable components, individual i believes that the items have been ordered in line with agent
m’s assessment of unobservable value, such that pj < pk if um(εj) ≥ um(εk). Individual i then
rationally infers that higher placed items must have higher unobservable components, εj ≥ εk for
pj < pk, as u
′
m(.) > 0, and consequently expects the items to be weakly ordered in value from top
to bottom, with Vij = vi(s) + ui(εj) ≥ Vik = vi(s) + ui(εk) for any pj < pk.
To assess the validity of these hypotheses, we propose the following two empirical tests. While
Empirical Test I has been used within existing studies, Empirical Test II is new to the literature.
7This explanation is analogous to satisficing (Simon 1955) in a limited selection setting, where individuals start
from the top and face marginal inspection costs for each item.
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Empirical Test I: Analysis of the Control and Treatment Groups. The explanation of
specific item order (H1) can be tested by comparing the control and treatment groups. Under H1,
top position effects exist only because an item with a relatively large observable value has been
placed in top position. Consequently, under H1, any possible top position effects should only arise
within the control group, where the items are likely to have been deliberately ordered by some
form of value. They should definitely not exist within the treatment group, where the item order
has been disrupted through randomisation. Hence, H1 can be rejected as a full explanation of top
position effects if such effects are documented within the treatment group.
In contrast, it is important to note that any evidence of top positions within the treatment
group cannot be used to rule out the explanations of choice fatigue (H2) and value signals (H3).
Crucially, even after an unannounced randomisation of item order within the treatment group, top
position effects may still occur because individuals might continue to hold, a now incorrect, belief
that top-placed items have the highest value (H3) or continue to find lower positioned items too
costly to download (H2). Therefore, in order to test these hypotheses, we require the introduction
of a new test.
Empirical Test II: Analysis of Other Position Effects. The explanations of choice fatigue
(H2) and value signals (H3) can be tested by analysing the possible significance of a broader set
of position effects, beyond just top position. Under H2, individuals have download costs that
are weakly increasing from top position downwards. Under H3, individuals expect, or have grown
accustomed, to item values that are weakly decreasing from top position downwards. In both cases,
average download activity should then be weakly decreasing in position. Hence, H2 and H3 can
be rejected as pure explanations of top position effects if we observe that the average number of
downloads received by items in a given position, p, is significantly larger than the average number
downloads received by items in a preceding position, p′ < p.
6 Empirical Test I: Comparing the Treatment and Control
Groups
To begin the analysis, this section now uses Empirical Test I to assess the explanatory power of H1
by examining how any top position effects differ between the control and treatment groups. For
an initial view of the data, Section 6.1 employs a simple descriptive test, before Section 6.2 uses a
more comprehensive estimation methodology.
6.1 Descriptive Analysis. If top position effects do not exist within the data then the download
activity for items in top position should be similar to items in other positions. In particular, if one
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defines the number of downloads received by the item in position p of list l as dpl, then we would
expect the number of downloads received by an item in top position averaged across all L lists,
(1/L)
∑L
l=1 dp=1,l, to tend towards the average number of downloads received per item across all
positions and all lists, (1/L)
∑L
l=1(1/nl)
∑nl
p=1 dpl. As Appendix 2 demonstrates, this statement
can be tested by using a simple test statistic, z, based on the central limit theorem. Alternatively,
one can also use a non-parametric test, such as a Wilcoxon test. In either case, note that the tests
remain robust to the fact that the lists were monitored for different lengths of time because the
tests compare levels of downloads averaged across all lists, rather than between different lists.
Table 2 presents the results for the control and treatment groups separately. It displays the
average number of actual downloads received per item in top position, the number of downloads
we would expect each top-placed item to receive absent position effects, the percentage difference
between the two, and the associated test statistics.
The results suggest that an item in top position within the control group receives 44% more
downloads than expected. However, quite contrary to an explanation based purely on specific
item order (H1), significant top position effects are also documented within the treatment group.
Despite the randomisation of item order, top-placed items are still downloaded 28% more than
expected, although this effect appears to be smaller and less significant to that in the control
group. At best, H1 therefore seems to offer only a partial explanation for top position effects.
6.2 Further Analysis. These results are now examined in more detail by estimating the rela-
tionship between the number of downloads received by each item, dpl, and a top position dummy
variable, Tp=1, while controlling for a range of other variables.
Any estimation strategy must account for two important features of the data. First, item
downloads can only take the form of a non-negative integer. Previous research using download
(or citation) data has not fully addressed this issue. Some studies have ignored it (e.g. Pinkowitz
2002), while others have treated it in a restrictive way. For example, Coupe et al (2010) employ a
Poisson model which tackles the problem by specifying that the dependent variable is drawn from
a Poisson distribution with conditional density, f(y|x) = (e−λ)(λy/y!) for y = 0, 1, 2..., where the
explanatory variables enter via λ = exβ . However, the Poisson model makes the strong assump-
tion of equi-dispersion, requiring the conditional mean to be equal to the conditional variance,
E(y|x) = V ar(y|x). As later confirmed in our results, this property is known to be rarely ob-
served in practice, and consequently, the Poisson model typically under-estimates standard errors.
To resolve this issue, we use a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator based on the Poisson distri-
bution (Poisson QMLE). The Poisson QMLE fully recognises that the Poisson distribution may
be inappropriate, but persists in using it in the knowledge that i) the coefficient estimates are
still consistent, ii) one can correct for the biased standard errors by using a robust estimator for
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the variance-covariance matrix under a weaker assumption, E(y|x) = σ2V ar(y|x), (where σ2 is
a parameter to be estimated), and usefully, iii) the model is also robust to any further forms of
mis-specification.8
Second, as discussed previously, some papers within the sample are included as items on the
lists of more than one subfield. This implies that some item-level observations that share the same
underlying paper are unlikely to be independent, resulting in invalid estimates of the standard
errors. To resolve this issue, we cluster the standard errors by paper. This approach allows the
error terms of a group of observations with the same underlying paper to have a correlated error
structure, while maintaining the assumption of independent errors for groups of observations with
different underlying papers.
Consequently, we proceed to model the downloads received by each item, dpl, using a QMLE
Poisson model with clustered standard errors. In particular, we first estimate Model 1 on the
control and treatment groups separately. Model 1 specifies the explanatory variables, x′plβ, as
β0 + β1Tp=1 + z
′
lβz + q
′
plβq (1)
where Tp=1 is a dummy variable which equals one only if an item is in a top position (p = 1),
and where zl and qpl are vectors of list-specific and item-specific control variables, respectively.
Any top position effects will be captured by the estimated value of β1.
The variables included in the list-specific controls, zl, are summarised in Table 3. These include
the total number of items within the item’s list, the number of subscribers registered on the list’s
subfield email alert at the date of the list’s release, and a set of subfield fixed effects. As the lists
vary in the length of time for which the downloads were monitored, we also include a measure of
each list’s ‘availability’ by calculating the number of days between the list’s release date and the
final observation cut-off date. In the vast majority of results, this variable proves insignificant due
to our long measurement period.
The item-specific control variables, qpl, are summarised in Table 4 and are constructed using
each item’s summary information. In particular, they refer to the item’s title language, length of
title, number of authors, length of abstract, length of keywords and number of JEL classification
codes.9 Finally, we also include a measure of the total number of lists (within the entire population
of NEP), in which each item’s underlying paper appeared. This variable could be negatively
correlated with our item-specific measure of downloads if it captures the possibility that a paper’s
8See Wooldridge (1999) for more details on the QMLE Poisson and its relative advantages. An alternative
approach could use a negative binomial model, but this is argued to be less robust. Unless otherwise stated, all our
main results can be replicated using the negative binomial model.
9Announcements also include information about the year in which each item was written but almost all items
were written at a time very close to the list release date and this proved insignificant in estimations.
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total downloads are dispersed over a larger number of lists. Alternatively, it could be positively
correlated if it is related to the item’s general appeal.
In addition to Model 1, we also estimate Model 2 on the entire sample in order to formally
test how the size of any top position effects differs between the control and treatment groups. As
summarised in (2), Model 2 simply includes two additional variables: treatl is a dummy variable
that equals one only if list l is in the treatment group, while Tp=1 ∗ treatl is an interaction term
which will capture any difference in the size of top position effects between the two groups.
β0 + β1Tp=1 + z
′
lβz + q
′
plβq + βT treatl + β1TTp=1 ∗ treatl (2)
It is important to remember that NEP uses data from each item’s summary information to
assign it a list position and that list position may, in turn, affect an item’s downloads. Consequently,
within the control group, we should be wary of interpreting the item-specific control variables which
derive from each item’s summary information because they may affect downloads both directly and
indirectly, through their effect on item position. As the item-specific control variables may also
be correlated with the top position dummy, there may be a further problem of multicollinearity
creating inefficient coefficient estimates. To improve robustness in this regard and more generally,
all later results are presented not just in the main specification with both the list-specific and
item specific controls (specification i), but also in specifications that omit the item-specific controls
(ii) and omit the list-specific controls (iii). In addition, we should remember that these problems
cannot be present in the treatment group where item order is unrelated to the items’ summary
information.
Table 5 presents the results for Model 1 across the control and treatment groups separately
and for Model 2 across the entire sample. After considering several possible quadratic terms, we
include them where significant. For brevity, only the calculated marginal effects are presented with
their associated z-statistics. In addition, each estimation displays the results of a Wald test for the
joint significance of all coefficients, χ2, the Akaike Information Criterion, AIC, and an estimate of
the mean-variance ratio, σˆ2, as described above. In support for our chosen methodology and in
rejection of the basic Poisson model, the estimates suggest a mean-variance ratio that is always
substantially greater than one.
The results offer some robust evidence for the existence and causes of top position effects. In
line with the descriptive findings, Table 5 suggests that items in top position within the control
group receive an average of 2.6-3.2 more downloads than items in other positions. When compared
to the average number of downloads per item, 5.46, this implies a large effect of around 50-60%.
However, top position effects are also significant within the treatment group. Items in top position
within the treatment group receive an average of 1.6-2.2 (30-40%) more downloads than items in
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other positions. The fact that top position effects remain significant despite the randomisation of
item order rules out an explanation based purely on the specific order of items (H1). Nevertheless,
while it is clear that specific item order cannot be the main cause of top position effects, the
randomisation of item order does significantly weaken the size of the estimated top position effects.
By considering the effect of the interaction term, Tp=1 ∗ Treatl, in Model 2, one can see that top
position effects are significantly smaller in the treatment group by a factor of about 20%. This
suggests that H1 has a minor explanatory role.10
Before further investigating the other possible causes of top position effects, we briefly comment
on some interesting side results in Table 5 concerning the effects of the control variables on item
downloads. To minimise any of the interpretation problems discussed above, these effects are best
viewed within the treatment group. First, items with an English title receive more downloads.
Second, downloads are decreasing in an item’s length of title (at an increasing rate). This fits with
Emerald Journals’ advice to keep titles relatively short to attract more attention.11 Third, perhaps
surprisingly, items with a higher number of authors receive fewer downloads. Fourth, the length
of an abstract provides no effect, but items with no abstract receive higher downloads. This is
consistent with the possibility that subscribers download such papers in order to find out whether
they wish to read them. Fifth, the number of JEL codes has no effect on downloads, but items with
zero JEL codes are associated with fewer downloads. Sixth, downloads are increasing in the length
of an item’s selection of keywords. Seventh, downloads are also increasing in the number of lists in
which the item’s underlying paper appears, perhaps reflecting the paper’s general appeal. Eighth,
as expected, a higher number of subscribers is associated with higher item downloads. Finally, as
further discussed in Section 8, an item’s downloads are decreasing in the number of items included
within its list.
For brevity, we do not always continue to report the full results of the control variables in later
tables, even when they are included in the estimations. However, we will return to further discuss
their effects in Section 8.
10Within the presented analysis, we have ignored the fact that some of the lists belong to a subfield where the
editor usually sorts the lists beyond that determined by the algorithm. Breaking down the data further in this
regard does not offer any major insights and adds substantial complication to the results. Within the control group,
top position effects are observed to be larger in editor-ordered lists as consistent with the intuitive possibility that
additional editor ordering improves the accuracy of the algorithm’s ordering. However, within the treatment group,
there are no differences between lists in subfields that usually receive additonal editor sorting and those that do not.
11http://www.emeraldinsight.com/authors/guides/promote/optimize1.htm?PHPSESSID=
7602t7ftgvi5r6g7shm06gg6c6,01/04/2011.
16
7 Empirical Test II: Analysing Other Position Effects
Having found that H1 can only offer a minor explanation for top position effects, this section now
assesses the explanations of choice fatigue (H2) and value signals (H3) by appealing to Empirical
Test II which involves the measurement of a broader set of position effects. As the two hypotheses
imply that either download costs are weakly increasing, or that expected item values are weakly
decreasing, from top position downwards, Empirical Test II suggests that H2 and H3 can both be
rejected as pure explanations of top position effects if the average number of downloads received
in a given position, p, is significantly larger than the average number of downloads received in a
preceding position, p′ < p.
However, any study of position effects (beyond top and bottom position), can force a necessary
reduction in sample size. This problem arises because positions can become ill-defined in lists that
contain too few items. For example, in a study of three positions; top, second and bottom, one
would have to drop all lists that contain only two items because the second and bottom position
are not uniquely defined. Consequently, there is a trade-off - the inclusion of more positions may
bring additional insights but it may also generate a reduction in sample size.
To help decide how many positions to focus on, Figure 1 displays the average number of
downloads received per-item across 8 positions (top, second, third, fourth, fourth-from-bottom
third-from-bottom, second-from-bottom and bottom) and compares this to the average number of
downloads received across all positions, using only the 391 lists within the sample that contain 8
or more items. This offers two suggestions. First, one should definitely include bottom position as
it appears that, contrary to H2 and H3, items in bottom position may receive significantly more
downloads than items in the position immediately above it. Second, the four interior positions
(third, fourth, fourth-from-bottom and third-from-bottom) appear to be relatively unimportant as
their effects are roughly decreasing in size and quite weak when compared to the sample average.
Consequently, we focus on the four ‘exterior’ positions (top, second, second-from-bottom and
bottom) using a sample of all lists with four or more items. However, our conclusions remain
robust under a variety of different approaches.12
To estimate such position effects, we extend the estimation methodology used in section 6.2 by
estimating Model 3 on the control and treatment groups separately. As summarised in (3), Model 3
estimates item downloads as a function of four position dummies, {Tp=1, Tp=2, Tp=nl−1, Tp=nl}, and
the original list-specific and item-specific control variables. The position effects will be captured
12In particular, we have tested the following alternative approaches, i) (top, bottom) with all lists, ii) (top,
second, third, third-from-bottom, second-from-bottom, bottom) with all lists of 6 or more, and iii) (top, second,
third, fourth, fourth-from-bottom, third-from-bottom, second-from-bottom, bottom) with all lists of 8 or more. The
results from ii) and iii) also confirm the insignificance of the four ‘interior’ positions, in line with Figure 1.
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by the estimated coefficients, β1 to β4.
β0 + β1Tp=1 + β2Tp=2 + β3Tp=nl−1 + β4Tp=nl + z
′
lβz + q
′
plβq (3)
Empirical Test II suggests that H2 and H3 can be rejected if there exists a position effect that is
significantly larger than an effect observed in a preceding position. Without loss for our purposes,
we perform three Wald tests to assess the equality of position effects in ‘adjacent’ positions; β1 −
β2 = 0, β2 − β3 = 0 and β3 − β4 = 0. Any rejection of these tests with βj−1 − βj < 0 will provide
evidence against H2 and H3.
While the effect of item randomisation on the position effects is no longer the main focus, it
will still be useful to assess how randomisation impacts upon the estimated coefficients. Therefore,
in a similar vein to Section 6.2, we estimate a further model with some additional terms using the
whole sample. In particular, Model 4 comprises of Model 3 plus treatl (which equals one if the list
is within the treatment group) and a vector of terms that interact each of the position dummies
with treatl.
The results are presented in Table 6. As before, it contains the marginal effects and z-statistics,
but in addition, the bottom of Table 6 also includes the results of the Wald tests and uses a minus
sign, (−), to highlight any cases where, contrary to H2 and H3, βj−1−βj < 0. For ease of reference,
Figure 2 plots the estimated position effects for the control and treatment groups using the results
from Table 6 under the main specification, 3(i).
First, if, like many previous studies, we ignore the importance of bottom position effects,
our results appear initally consistent with choice fatigue (H2) and value signals (H3). In the
control group, the top position effect is accompanied by a positive second position effect and
overall, downloads are strictly decreasing in position. Similarly, in the treatment group, while item
randomisation eliminates the second position effect, downloads are weakly decreasing in position
as consistent with H2 and H3. However, once we consider bottom position, our results provide a
very different conclusion. Contrary to a pattern of weakly-decreasing downloads, items in bottom
position are reported to receive significantly more downloads than the items placed in the position
immediately above them. Moreover, items in bottom position actually receive significantly more
downloads than average. While weaker than the documented top position effects, these ‘bottom
position effects’ are extremely robust, as item randomisation has no significant effect on their
magnitude within the treatment group. The presence of such bottom position effects rules out
the common hypotheses of choice fatigue (H2) and value signals (H3) as pure explanations for
top position effects. It cannot be that top position effects exist just because individuals find it
increasingly costly to make downloads from lower positions (H2). Nor can it be that top position
effects exist just because individuals expect, or have grown accustomed to, the possibility that
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NEP arranges its items in descending order of value (H3). Such hypotheses cannot explain the
disproportionate download activity for items in bottom position. However, in Section 9 where
we discuss some further explanations for our results, we do note that these findings could still be
consistent with some more complex versions of choice fatigue and value signals.
Finally, we must stress that the existence of bottom position effects is not artificially generated
by the two-section design of the NEP announcements. As explained in Section 3 and illustrated in
Appendix 1, by clicking on the top item within the upper section of the announcement an individual
is indeed taken to the summary information of the top item in the lower section. However, when
inspecting this summary information, it is not the case that the individual’s attention is artificially
drawn upwards to the bottom item within the upper section of the announcement. Instead, the
bottom item is off-screen and the individual would have to deliberately scroll upwards in order to
see this item.
8 Further Empirical Analysis - The Role of List Length
The results offer no easy explanation of top position effects. Specific item order (H1), choice fatigue
(H2) and value signals (H3) have been ruled out as pure explanations for top position effects due to
the existence of bottom position effects and due to the fact that top position effects remain, even
when the order of items has been randomised. Consequently, the documented top (and bottom)
position effects must have some other more complex cause. To understand more, this section now
explores some further features of the data. In particular, it considers the role of list length. In
addition to showing how list length can affect the size top position effects, we step further beyond
the existing literature by demonstrating how list length has an important influence on the cause
of top position effects.
Across the sample, the number of items included within most lists varies from 2-54.13 This
variation arises not only from differences in the supply of academic papers over time and across
subfields, but also from differences in the selectivity of editors across different subfields. Hence,
the variation in list length may not be exogenous. However, the subfield fixed effects and other
variables may offer some control for this possibility, and it remains hard to explain how such
potential endogeneity could provide a full account for our later results.
Within the limited selection setting, Ho and Imai (2008) and Blocksom (2008) show that top
position effects can be increasing in list length. In a related search context, Meyer (1997) also
shows that laboratory subjects conduct fewer searches to select an item when faced with longer
lists. Within our different, unlimited selection setting, we now extend this evidence by examining
13One outlying list contains 118 items but its exclusion does not affect the results.
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how our four position effects vary with list length. In particular, we estimate Model 5, summarised
by (4). Like Model 3, it contains the four position dummies and the control variables but it also
includes a set of interaction terms, Tp ∗ nl, to capture how each position effect varies with list
length, nl, (and specifies list length as a separate variable, rather than as just a member of the
control variables).14
β0 + β1Tp=1 + β2Tp=2 + β3Tp=nl−1 + β4Tp=nl
+β1nTp=1 ∗ nl + β2nTp=2 ∗ nl + β3nTp=nl−1 ∗ nl + β4nTp=nl ∗ nl
+βnnl + z
′
lβz + q
′
plβq
(4)
The results are presented in Table 7. While the effects of second, second-from-bottom and
bottom position remain independent of list length, top position effects become significantly larger
in lists that contain more items, especially in the treatment group. As list length increases,
individuals appear to focus their download activity more towards items in top position.15
We now take a more original step beyond the existing literature by demonstrating how list
length can have a fundamental role in determining, not only the size of top position effects, but
also their cause.
The estimations of the four position effects from Section 7 (Models 3 and 4) are now repeated
on two subsamples of ‘short’ and ‘long’ lists separately. The two subsamples are created by dividing
the sample of lists with 4 or more items around its median list length of 11. The subsample of
short lists then includes 282 lists that contain between 4-11 items, while the subsample of long
lists includes the 250 lists that contain 12 or more items. The results for the estimations and the
corresponding Wald tests are presented in Table 8 for short lists, and in Table 9 for long lists. For
ease of reference, the estimated position effects from the main model specification, 3(i), are also
displayed graphically for short and long lists in Figure 3.
First, consider the results for short lists. The contrast is dramatic. Within the control group,
significant position effects are documented in top and second position. However, both of these
effects are now completely eliminated once item order has been randomised within the treatment
group. Indeed, after randomisation, there is little evidence of any position effects whatsoever
14Once again, the results remain robust using a different number of positions. The addition of further interaction
terms to allow for the effects of list length squared proved insignificant.
15In addition, as also previously reported in Table 5, it is interesting to note how list length itself exerts a strong
negative effect on the number of downloads received by each item regardless of item position (via the variable, nl).
While one can check that the aggregate number of downloads received by all items within each list is increasing in
list length, this result suggests that, on average, an individual item within a list that includes relatively more items,
receives significantly fewer downloads. An explanation for this finding involving the caveat above cannot be ruled
out - longer lists could contain items of lower (expected) value.
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within short lists. These findings are now wholly consistent with the rather trivial explanation of
specific item order (H1). They also add further weight against the possibility that position effects
are driven by some form of habit.16
Next, consider the results for long lists. Again, top position and second position effects are
documented within the control group but now top position effects are much larger in magnitude.
More importantly, there are two striking differences in regard to the causes of top position effects.
First, randomisation of item order has no significant effect on the size of the top position effects,
suggesting that top position effects are more robust in longer lists and that specific item order (H1)
can offer no explanation for the results. Second, in both the control and the treatment groups,
items in bottom position now receive significantly more downloads than items in the penultimate
position and significantly more downloads than average, ruling out choice fatigue (H2) and value
signals (H3) as pure explanations. Consequently, in contrast to short lists, top position effects in
long lists are now inconsistent with all three explanations, H1-H3.17
In summary, increases in list length generate i) larger top position effects, ii) more robust top
position effects and iii) significant bottom position effects. This indicates that the source of top
position effects is inherently linked to list length. In longer lists, top position effects have a cause
that is deeper and more complex than the simple hypotheses commonly referred to within the
literature, H1-H3.
These findings also suggest that increases in list length may trigger qualitative changes in
individuals’ behaviour. In line with this possibility, we note one final effect of list length with respect
to the item-specific control variables. By viewing the estimation results within the treatment group
to minimise any interpretation concerns (as discussed in Section 6), one can see that i) fewer item-
specific control variables are significant within the long list sample relative to the short list sample,
and ii) within the long list sample, the only significant item-specific control variables relate to an
item’s title. This suggests that, when faced with longer lists, individuals may reduce their use of
the listed summary information to consider only the item title as a guide for their decision-making.
16By observing the variable, treat, in Model 4, one can also note that randomisation appears to actually increase
average item downloads within short lists. This may suggest that individuals are able to infer that the items are
not ordered as usual and that individuals subsequently decide to inspect the list more thoroughly than they would
do normally. If so, there may be a second explanation for the results, related to H3 - individuals use positions as a
value signal only when the items have indeed been sorted. This effect is not present in longer lists.
17The results here differ very slightly if one uses the alternative estimation procedure involving a negative binomial
model or if one divides the sample in two at the median observation which gives subsamples with 4-14 and 15+ items
rather than dividing the sample by the median list length. In these cases, top position effects within the treatment
group of the short lists subsample are marginally significant implying that top position effects in the short sample
are only largely, rather than wholly, consistent with H1 (or the variant of H3). However, the differences between
short and long lists remains clear.
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However, because the variation in list length is not exogenous, we cannot rule out the alternative
possibility that individuals make less use of the provided information in longer lists because items
in longer lists have less informative summary information.
9 Possible Explanations
In light of these results, rather than the common hypotheses H1-H3, this section now discusses how
top position effects may be more consistent with some less-studied and more complex hypotheses
and urges further research to better consider such explanations in the future.
First, bounded rationality offers an excellent description of our results. When faced with
cognitively demanding tasks, it is well known that individuals often replace fully rational decision
strategies with biased heuristics to economise on cognitive resources (e.g. Payne et al 1993). By
explicitly analysing the complexity of alternative choice rules, Salant (2011) demonstrates this
within the context of choice within lists. In longer lists, when the decision is more difficult, he
shows how it may be optimal for individuals to switch to a decision rule that is simpler than
the rational decision rule and that simpler decision rules necessarily generate order effects, such
as top and bottom position effects. This explanation seems highly consistent with our findings
and also with the suggestion in the data that individuals may become less dependent upon using
each item’s full summary information to guide their download decisions in longer lists. However,
Salant’s model is constructed under the assumption that individuals select one item from a list
and it remains unclear how his results extend to a setting such as ours with unlimited selection.
Second, we suggest that our findings are also consistent with an explanation of memory limita-
tions. Rather than making their download decisions in sequence as they progressively inspect each
item, some individuals may move back and return to download a previously inspected item. In this
scenario, individuals may be more likely to return to items that they can better remember. This
could then lead to top and bottom position effects because individuals are well known to exhibit
biases in memory recall towards items listed first and last (e.g. Tan and Ward 2000). Moreover, as
consistent with our results, evidence suggests that these effects become more pronounced in longer
lists (e.g. Ward et al 2010).
Finally, while we have laregly rejected the common simple explanations of choice fatigue (H2)
and value signals (H3), some more complex versions of these hypotheses may offer an account
for our findings. For example, consider a modified version of choice fatigue where a fraction of
individuals find it increasing costly to download items but inspect the list from bottom to top
rather than from top to bottom. As consistent with the results, in aggregate, items in top and
bottom position would then be more likely to receive downloads in lists that are sufficiently long to
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induce fatigue effects. Alternatively, in a setting where individuals have positive inspection costs,
it is possible that bottom position effects may also arise when individuals inspect items from top
to bottom and either i) have additional recall costs of returning to a previously searched item or
ii) progressively learn more about the quality distribution of items as they search. However, these
latter explanations appear less able to account for the documented patterns regarding list length.18
10 Conclusion
This paper goes beyond previous research that documents top position effects by using a natural
field experiment to better understand their causes within a less-studied context of individual choice
from lists. When lists are short, the paper shows that any tendency for individuals to select items
located at the top of a list is totally eliminated once the order of items has been randomised. This
is consistent with top position effects that existed only because of the specific order in which the
items were presented. However, as lists grow longer, our results indicate that individuals display
several qualitative changes in behaviour. Individuals start to concentrate their download activity
towards items in top position, generating top position effects which are larger and more robust even
when the order of items has been randomised, and individuals begin to exhibit positive bottom
position effects. The paper then uses these findings to reject three explanations for top position
effects that are commonly cited within the literature and suggests, instead, that they may be more
consistent with some less-studied and more complex explanations, such as bounded rationality and
memory limitations.
While we cannot formally test between these further hypotheses using our aggregate data,
we urge the literature to better consider such explanations in the future and suggest that the
development of eye-tracking software may offer much hope in this regard. Expanding on some
early work on advertising by Lohse (1997) and others, Reutskaja et al (2011) use such software
to analyse subjects’ choices of snacks from a grid of options. Among many other results, they
find that subjects look more frequently at, and are more likely to choose, items located in the top
left-hand corner, or the middle, of the grid. We imagine that the full application of such techniques
to the study of position effects in lists is likely to be very fruitful.
Finally, we note some possible implications for our results. First, concerns over the alleged bias
in search engine results or the quality of individual decision making and the subsequent impact in
reducing competition may be most relevant when there are more options. Second, firms may have
18Although not an explanation in itself, we also note that top (and bottom) position effects could be enhanced
by a further factor. If there is an advantage from selecting the same items as other individuals and if individuals
know that other individuals exhibit top (and bottom) position effects, then it may be optimal to also select items
in top (and bottom) position.
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an incentive to artificially lengthen their product lines and rearrange the order of their products to
exploit consumers’ position effects. Similarly, search engines and other platforms may profit from
artificially increasing their listed options to enhance the ‘value’ of top positions. Further work on
these issues that builds on the emerging literatures referred to within the introduction appears
highly warranted.
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...The remaining items in positions 2 to 7 are then presented sequentially in a similar format.
Appendix 2: Construction of the Descriptive Test Statistic
The test is related to that used by Koppell and Steen (2004) and Meredith and Salant (2011) in
the context of ballot ordering. Let dpl derive from some unspecified list-specific random variable
with finite mean, µl, and variance, σ
2
l . Under a null hypothesis of no position effects, the fol-
lowing two statements should be true. First, the average number of downloads per item in list
l, (1/nl)
∑nl
p=1 dpl, should tend towards the mean for list l, µl. Second, the average number of
downloads per-item observed in position p across all L lists, (1/L)
∑L
l=1 dpl, should tend towards
the average mean across all L lists, (1/L)
∑L
l=1 µl. We wish to test if these relationships hold for
p=1. For any set of parent distributions, the Lindberg-Fuller version of the central limit theorem
suggests that the test statistic,
√
L[(1/L)
∑L
l=1 dp=1,l − (1/L)
∑L
l=1(1/nl)
∑nl
p=1 dpl], is asymptoti-
cally distributed by N(0, σ2)where σ is the average standard deviation in the limit. By rearranging
and replacing σ with its sample variant, s =
√
(1/L)
∑L
l=1 s
2
l (where s
2
l is the sample variance of
list l), the test statistic, z = [
∑L
l=1 dp=1,l −
∑L
l=1(1/nl)
∑nl
p=1 dpl]/
√∑L
l=1 s
2
l , is distributed by
N(0, 1).
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Tables and Figures
Throughout the tables, we use two-tailed tests and employ *, ** and *** to denote significance at 5%,
1% and 0.1%. The reported Wilcoxon test statistic is in the form of its equivalent z-value.
Table 1: Sample Summary Statistics
All Control Treatment
Number of lists 577 389 188
Total number of items 6740 4363 2377
Average number of items per list 11.68 11.21 12.64
Total number of downloads across items 36276 23829 12447
Average number of downloads per item 5.38 5.46 5.24
Total number of papers 4985 - -
Average number of list appearances per paper (within sample) 1.35 - -
Average number of list appearances per paper (within NEP) 3.88 - -
By definition, a paper may appear in both the control and treatment groups as a different item.
Table 2: Descriptive Tests of Top Position Effects
Control Treatment
Number of lists 389 188
Average actual downloads per top-placed item 8.65 7.47
Expected downloads per item 6.01 5.83
% Difference (actual - expected) 43.87 28.12
z test 11.28*** 5.22***
Wilcoxon test 5.07*** 2.13*
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Table 3: Summary of List-Specific Control Variables
(across items) (across lists)
Name Description Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
n The number (no.) of items included in the list 17.72 16.18 11.68 8.41 2 118
subs The no. of subscribers to the list’s subfield at release date 575 428 526 415 59 2080
av The no. of days for which the list was available 769 43 770 44 695 841
subfields A set of fixed effects for the subfields - - - - - -
Table 4: Summary of Item-Specific Control Variables
(across items) (across lists)
Name Description Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
engtitle Whether the item has an English title (1=yes) 0.99 0.09 0.99 0.10 0 1
title No. of characters in item’s title (divided by 100) 0.76 0.28 0.75 0.28 0.05 2.43
authors No. of authors 2.16 1.09 2.16 1.10 1 15
zeroab Whether the item has no abstract (1=no abstract) 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 0 1
abstract No. of characters in item’s abstract (divided by 100) 9.82 5.30 9.80 5.52 0 148
zerokey Whether or not the item has no keywords (1=no keywords) 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 0 1
keywords Total no. of characters in item’s keywords (divided by 100) 0.64 0.48 0.63 0.49 0 4.65
zerojel Whether the item has no JEL codes (1=no JEL codes) 0.40 0.49 0.42 0.49 0 1
jel No. of JEL codes provided for the item 1.91 1.92 1.85 1.91 0 13
repstotal No. of lists within NEP in which the paper appears 4.21 1.51 3.88 1.39 2 12
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Table 5: Estimation Results of Top Position Effects
Sample: Control Treatment All
Model Spec: 1(i) 1(ii) 1(iii) 1(i) 1(ii) 1(iii) 2(i) 2(ii) 2(iii)
top 2.593*** 2.714*** 3.156*** 1.566*** 1.578*** 2.184*** 2.497*** 2.632*** 3.103***
(9.99) (10.14) (9.11) (4.76) (4.53) (5.10) (9.77) (9.97) (9.08)
top*treat - - - - - - -0.562* -0.611* -0.557
- - - - - - (2.09) (2.21) (1.57)
treat - - - - - - 0.202 0.127 0.013
- - - - - - (1.87) (1.14) (0.10)
engtitle 2.366*** - 2.660*** 2.468*** - 2.756*** 2.366*** - 2.679***
(8.49) - (8.05) (5.52) - (4.90) (9.98) - (9.41)
title -3.867*** - -5.617*** -3.851*** - -5.827*** -3.951*** - -5.748***
(4.28) - (5.02) (3.39) - (3.84) (5.50) - (6.31)
title2 1.363** - 1.717** 1.288* - 2.083* 1.384*** - 1.888***
(2.76) - (2.82) (2.13) - (2.51) (3.58) - (3.79)
authors -0.216*** - -0.251** -0.210** - -0.222* -0.223*** - -0.245***
(3.54) - (3.18) (2.70) - (2.27) (4.56) - (3.91)
zeroab 1.787** - 0.942 1.898* - 0.942 1.804*** - 0.925
(3.15) - (1.38) (2.41) - (0.92) (3.93) - (1.63)
abstract -0.028* - -0.044* 0.001 - -0.03 -0.018 - -0.040**
(2.06) - (2.50) (0.10) - (1.12) (1.59) - (2.60)
zerokey 0.964** - 1.001* 0.232 - 1.034 0.774** - 1.034**
(3.06) - (2.50) (0.64) - (1.96) (3.19) - (3.21)
keywords 0.404 - -0.281 -0.929 - -0.919 0.068 - -0.487
(1.20) - (0.64) (1.93) - (1.51) (0.25) - (1.35)
keywords2 -0.061 - 0.075 0.474** - 0.273 0.042 - 0.133
(0.69) - (0.64) (2.81) - (1.49) (0.52) - (1.35)
zerojel -0.317 - -0.649* -0.585* - -0.69 -0.427* - -0.693**
(1.33) - (2.13) (2.00) - (1.80) (2.27) - (2.87)
jel -0.096 - -0.093 -0.066 - -0.029 -0.09 - -0.076
(1.66) - (1.25) (0.92) - (0.31) (1.96) - (1.26)
repstotal 0.003 - -0.014 0.165** - 0.159* 0.056 - 0.045
(0.07) - (0.25) (3.05) - (2.37) (1.64) - (1.02)
n -0.042*** -0.045*** - -0.044*** -0.052*** - -0.042*** -0.047*** -
(9.08) (9.61) - (3.43) (3.89) - (9.41) (10.28) -
subs 0.007* 0.011*** - 0.008** 0.010*** - 0.008*** 0.011*** -
(2.37) (3.58) - (3.26) (4.21) - (4.20) (5.52) -
av -0.004* -0.002 - 0.002 0.006 - -0.003 -0.001 -
(2.18) (0.88) - (0.46) (1.41) - (1.84) (0.49) -
subfields Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Obs 4363 4363 4363 2377 2377 2377 6740 6740 6740
Lists 389 389 389 188 188 188 577 577 577
Clusters 3361 3361 3361 1907 1907 1907 4985 4985 4985
χ2 2672*** 2377*** 372*** 1404*** 1184*** 167*** 3749*** 3331*** 512***
AIC 25051 25625 29743 12944 13256 15477 38066 38930 45238
σˆ2 3.02 3.30 4.38 2.47 2.70 3.83 2.84 3.10 4.19
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Table 6: Other Position Effects - Estimation and Test Results
Sample: Control Treatment All
Model Spec: 3(i) 3(ii) 3(iii) 3(i) 3(ii) 3(iii) 4(i) 4(ii) 4(iii)
top 2.952*** 3.055*** 3.393*** 1.761*** 1.818*** 2.371*** 2.841*** 2.976*** 3.329***
(10.73) (10.64) (9.64) (4.98) (4.86) (5.21) (10.60) (10.50) (9.56)
top*treat - - - - - - -0.601* -0.619* -0.571
- - - - - - (2.22) (2.18) (1.59)
sec 1.673*** 1.651*** 2.048*** 0.489 0.593 0.899* 1.611*** 1.590*** 2.006***
(6.57) (6.28) (6.10) (1.69) (1.87) (2.19) (6.52) (6.18) (6.05)
sec*treat - - - - - - -0.739** -0.657* -0.785*
- - - - - - (2.63) (2.14) (2.08)
secbot -0.239 -0.242 -0.190 -0.169 -0.125 0.114 -0.273 -0.276 -0.201
(1.18) (1.16) (0.71) (0.65) (0.45) (0.32) (1.36) (1.33) (0.76)
secbot*treat - - - - - - 0.206 0.279 0.327
- - - - - - (0.57) (0.72) (0.68)
bot 0.795** 0.804* 1.077** 0.941*** 1.040*** 1.447*** 0.742* 0.755* 1.040**
(2.70) (2.53) (3.01) (3.56) (3.66) (3.81) (2.56) (2.43) (2.93)
bot*treat - - - - - - 0.318 0.394 0.394
- - - - - - (0.88) (1.01) (0.84)
treat - - - - - - 0.250* 0.150 0.061
- - - - - - (2.06) (1.22) (0.40)
Item Controls Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
List Controls Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Obs 4271 4271 4271 2360 2360 2360 6631 6631 6631
Lists 351 351 351 181 181 181 532 532 532
Clusters 3311 3311 3311 1900 1900 1900 4937 4937 4937
χ2 2707*** 2449*** 400*** 1398*** 1195*** 187*** 3763*** 3410*** 556***
AIC 24084 24652 28517 12819 13119 15269 36991 37845 43809
σˆ2 2.88 3.15 4.14 2.47 2.69 3.81 2.76 3.01 4.02
Wald Tests:
Top-Sec 14.05*** 15.77*** 8.63** 9.18** 7.26** 6.26* - - -
Sec-Secbot 42.54*** 39.59*** 31.89*** 3.42 3.34 2.38 - - -
Secbot-Bot (-)9.85** (-)8.97** (-)8.85** (-)10.33** (-)9.60** (-)7.05** - - -
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Table 7: The Effect of List Length on the Size of Position Effects
Sample: Control Treatment
Model Spec: 5(i) 5(ii) 5(iii) 5(i) 5(ii) 5(iii)
top 2.229*** 2.411*** 1.874*** 0.138 -0.006 0.085
(5.87) (6.02) (4.02) (0.29) (0.01) (0.14)
top*n 0.039* 0.034* 0.060** 0.105*** 0.120*** 0.119**
(2.51) (2.12) (3.00) (3.89) (4.00) (3.24)
sec 1.103** 1.043* 0.719 0.473 0.594 0.614
(2.73) (2.57) (1.53) (0.62) (0.70) (0.61)
sec*n 0.036 0.038 0.061* -0.001 -0.003 -0.010
(1.46) (1.55) (2.13) (0.03) (0.06) (0.16)
secbot 0.182 0.134 -0.334 0.367 0.538 0.391
(0.36) (0.26) (0.70) (0.53) (0.69) (0.46)
secbot*n -0.038 -0.035 -0.016 -0.047 -0.056 -0.054
(1.11) (0.95) (0.49) (1.04) (1.17) (0.99)
bot 0.718 0.676 0.347 1.098 1.238* 1.148
(1.77) (1.57) (0.79) (1.89) (2.08) (1.47)
bot*n 0.004 0.007 0.027 -0.014 -0.017 -0.011
(0.14) (0.26) (0.97) (0.39) (0.50) (0.26)
n -0.038*** -0.040*** -0.047*** -0.045*** -0.052*** -0.077***
(8.28) (8.74) (10.76) (3.39) (3.84) (5.79)
Item Controls Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
List Controls Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Obs 4271 4271 4271 2360 2360 2360
Lists 351 351 351 181 181 181
Clusters 3311 3311 3311 1900 1900 1900
χ2 2721*** 2460*** 576*** 1428*** 1215*** 230***
AIC 24067 24639 28215 12789 13077 15087
σˆ2 2.87 3.15 4.04 2.45 2.66 3.67
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Table 8: Estimated Position Effects for Short Lists (with 4-11 items)
Sample: Control Treatment All
Model Spec: 3(i) 3(ii) 3(iii) 3(i) 3(ii) 3(iii) 4(i) 4(ii) 4(iii)
top 2.445*** 2.633*** 2.921*** 0.841 0.702 1.223 2.418*** 2.658*** 3.026***
(6.28) (6.27) (5.52) (1.61) (1.28) (1.67) (6.14) (6.26) (5.48)
top*treat - - - - - - -1.147** -1.323** -1.453**
- - - - - - (2.77) (3.16) (2.61)
sec 1.336*** 1.266*** 1.620*** 0.156 0.312 0.512 1.307*** 1.244*** 1.701***
(4.05) (3.69) (3.34) (0.32) (0.54) (0.63) (3.85) (3.51) (3.37)
sec*treat - - - - - - -0.883 -0.700 -1.076
- - - - - - (1.92) (1.31) (1.59)
secbot -0.173 -0.210 -0.201 -0.424 -0.179 -0.265 -0.259 -0.282 -0.202
(0.55) (0.65) (0.46) (0.95) (0.34) (0.40) (0.80) (0.85) (0.45)
secbot*treat - - - - - - -0.055 0.240 -0.104
- - - - - - (0.10) (0.37) (0.13)
bot 0.384 0.497 0.630 0.568 0.985* 0.956 0.338 0.450 0.674
(1.26) (1.44) (1.41) (1.48) (2.10) (1.51) (1.05) (1.24) (1.46)
bot*treat - - - - - - 0.360 0.554 0.192
- - - - - - (0.74) (0.99) (0.28)
treat - - - - - - 0.937** 0.800* 1.224**
- - - - - - (3.02) (2.47) (2.87)
engtitle 2.425*** - 3.042*** 2.374** - 3.339** 2.488*** - 3.185***
(5.76) - (4.95) (2.68) - (3.24) (6.32) - (6.20)
title -0.348** - -0.211 -4.855* - -7.182* -3.816** - -4.529*
(3.10) - (1.31) (2.16) - (2.19) (2.89) - (2.30)
title2 -1.864 - -1.828 1.645 - 2.573 1.166 - 1.034
(1.09) - (0.78) (1.38) - (1.42) (1.55) - (0.86)
authors -0.080 - -0.717 -0.462* - -0.299 -0.395*** - -0.253
(0.08) - (0.49) (2.54) - (1.12) (4.01) - (1.86)
zeroab 0.804 - 0.267 4.424* - 2.333 1.748* - 0.794
(0.90) - (0.24) (2.37) - (0.88) (2.07) - (0.72)
abstract -0.053* - -0.068 -0.011 - -0.065 -0.037 - -0.069*
(2.06) - (1.86) (0.30) - (1.17) (1.77) - (2.22)
zerokey 0.973 - 1.028 0.348 - 1.601 0.816 - 1.214*
(1.90) - (1.54) (0.49) - (1.36) (1.91) - (2.02)
keywords 0.226 - -0.077 -1.960* - -0.498 -0.288 - -0.210
(0.41) - (0.10) (2.29) - (0.39) (0.60) - (0.32)
keywords2 0.015 - 0.051 0.842*** - 0.226 0.163 - 0.097
(0.11) - (0.26) (4.26) - (0.78) (1.50) - (0.61)
zerojel -0.478 - -0.543 -1.365** - -1.543* -0.742* - -0.824
(1.28) - (1.08) (2.60) - (2.08) (2.35) - (1.91)
jel -0.238** - -0.289* -0.177 - -0.231 -0.220** - -0.262*
(2.58) - (2.31) (1.40) - (1.22) (2.88) - (2.43)
repstotal 0.050 - -0.041 0.221 - 0.115 0.086 - -0.001
(0.74) - (0.43) (1.95) - (0.77) (1.46) - (0.02)
n -0.068 -0.077 - -0.222* -0.186 - -0.153** -0.147** -
(1.12) (1.20) - (2.35) (1.83) - (3.14) (2.82) -
subs 0.020* 0.024* - 0.004 0.014 - 0.013 0.017** -
(2.04) (2.36) - (0.48) (1.68) - (1.92) (2.59) -
av 0.001 0.004 - -0.006 0.002 - -0.002 0.002 -
(0.34) (1.05) - (0.63) (0.23) - (0.51) (0.55) -
subfields Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Obs 1471 1471 1471 633 633 633 2104 2104 2104
Lists 199 199 199 83 83 83 282 282 282
Clusters 1295 1295 1295 572 572 572 1814 1814 1814
χ2 1407*** 1236*** 126*** 695*** 523*** 51*** 1846*** 1582*** 167***
AIC 8320 8588 10540 3728 3939 4814 12175 12613 15375
σˆ2 2.68 2.97 4.60 2.62 3.14 4.76 2.74 3.07 4.66
Wald Tests
Top-Sec 6.76** 9.52** 4.59* 1.21 0.30 0.53 - - -
Sec-Secbot 14.14*** 12.92*** 9.98** 1.08 0.50 0.77 - - -
Secbot-Bot (-)2.06 (-)2.85 (-)2.24 (-)3.84* (-)3.39 (-)2.20 - - -
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Table 9: Estimated Position Effects for Long Lists (with 12+ items)
Sample: Control Treatment All
Model Spec: 3(i) 3(ii) 3(iii) 3(i) 3(ii) 3(iii) 4(i) 4(ii) 4(iii)
top 3.338*** 3.396*** 3.776*** 2.433*** 2.575*** 2.739*** 3.249*** 3.321*** 3.666***
(8.67) (8.24) (7.96) (5.33) (5.21) (4.45) (8.58) (8.16) (7.94)
top*treat - - - - - - -0.464 -0.379 -0.492
- - - - - - (1.32) (0.99) (1.08)
sec 1.946*** 1.979*** 2.372*** 0.485 0.555 0.541 1.909*** 1.941*** 2.287***
(5.07) (4.83) (4.90) (1.55) (1.67) (1.43) (5.13) (4.90) (4.86)
sec*treat - - - - - - -1.016** -0.986** -1.188**
- - - - - - (3.26) (2.98) (3.18)
secbot -0.460 -0.435 -0.439 -0.368 -0.400 -0.378 -0.436 -0.413 -0.424
(1.85) (1.65) (1.32) (1.39) (1.50) (1.07) (1.79) (1.61) (1.31)
secbot*treat - - - - - - 0.042 -0.035 0.025
- - - - - - (0.10) (0.09) (0.05)
bot 1.088* 1.039 1.395* 0.872* 0.820* 1.052* 1.067* 1.025 1.325*
(2.06) (1.86) (2.22) (2.41) (2.25) (2.20) (2.06) (1.90) (2.16)
bot*treat - - - - - - -0.118 -0.155 -0.151
- - - - - - (0.23) (0.29) (0.24)
treat - - - - - - 0.074 -0.002 -0.178
- - - - - - (0.58) (0.01) (1.19)
engtitle 2.161*** - 2.304*** 3.005*** - 3.266*** 2.305*** - 2.489***
(5.61) - (5.43) (10.46) - (11.03) (7.38) - (7.43)
title -4.232*** - -6.420*** -3.217** - -4.545** -3.819*** - -5.710***
(4.09) - (5.32) (2.66) - (2.98) (4.74) - (6.01)
title2 1.485** - 2.065*** 1.073 - 1.589 1.307** - 1.868***
(2.77) - (3.32) (1.64) - (1.87) (3.11) - (3.74)
authors -0.151* - -0.231** -0.130 - -0.117 -0.145** - -0.192**
(2.24) - (2.79) (1.77) - (1.31) (2.82) - (3.12)
zeroab 2.278*** - 1.436 0.682 - 0.099 1.706*** - 0.962
(3.42) - (1.79) (1.51) - (0.14) (3.71) - (1.70)
abstract -0.011 - -0.021 0.005 - -0.017 -0.004 - -0.02
(0.73) - (1.22) (0.42) - (0.66) (0.42) - (1.31)
zerokey 0.789* - 0.701 0.288 - 0.833 0.605* - 0.755*
(2.15) - (1.57) (0.67) - (1.41) (2.22) - (2.21)
keywords 0.223 - -0.668 -0.059 - -0.759 0.095 - -0.713
(0.53) - (1.29) (0.09) - (0.85) (0.28) - (1.71)
keywords2 0.005 - 0.211 0.066 - 0.154 0.029 - 0.204
(0.04) - (1.35) (0.22) - (0.41) (0.23) - (1.47)
zerojel -0.136 - -0.438 -0.063 - -0.282 -0.092 - -0.392
(0.43) - (1.18) (0.18) - (0.69) (0.39) - (1.41)
jel -0.001 - 0.017 0.022 - 0.053 0.009 - 0.026
(0.02) - (0.18) (0.26) - (0.53) (0.15) - (0.37)
repstotal -0.027 - -0.001 0.139* - 0.137 0.031 - 0.052
(0.51) - (0.01) (2.40) - (1.94) (0.79) - (1.11)
n -0.034*** -0.036*** - -0.014 -0.018 - -0.029*** -0.032*** -
(7.63) (7.96) - (1.10) (1.39) - (7.11) (7.65) -
subs 0.008* 0.011*** - 0.009*** 0.010*** - 0.009*** 0.011*** -
(2.48) (3.49) - (3.48) (3.76) - (4.34) (5.14) -
av -0.002 0.000 - 0.000 0.004 - -0.001 0.000 -
(0.79) (0.01) - (0.08) (0.91) - (0.59) (0.12) -
subfields Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Obs 2800 2800 2800 1727 1727 1727 4527 4527 4527
Lists 152 152 152 98 98 98 250 250 250
Clusters 2362 2362 2362 1484 1484 1484 3692 3692 3692
χ2 1580*** 1412*** 297*** 879*** 768*** 154*** 2270*** 2035*** 413***
AIC 15606 15945 17901 8932 9039 10313 24620 25045 28230
σˆ2 2.90 3.18 3.85 2.30 2.41 3.28 2.71 2.90 3.64
Wald Tests:
Top-Sec 6.87** 6.34* 4.43* 14.58*** 13.43*** 11.10*** - - -
Sec-Secbot 33.56*** 30.03*** 26.46*** 4.88* 5.68* 3.45 - - -
Secbot-Bot (-)8.59** (-)6.98** (-)7.86** (-)8.86** (-)8.53** (-)6.52* - - -
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Figure 1: Average Per-Item Downloads by Position (Compared to Average Across All Positions)
Figure 2: Estimated Position Effects (Marginal Effects from Main Specification)
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Figure 3: Estimated Position Effects in Short and Long Lists Respectively
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